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1  Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
As stated in its Charter, one of the most important purposes of the United Nations 
Organizations (UN) is to maintain international peace and security, to save the succeeding 
generations from ”the scourge of war”.1 To carry out that purpose the UN, and  the 
Security Council (SC) particularly is mandated to determine any existence of threats to the 
international peace and security and decide what measures should be taken including the 
use of force.2 Peace operations are such measures that the Security Council recourses to.   
 
The term ”peace operations”, however, was not  mentioned concretely in the Charter. The 
concept has been developed from time to time in coping with the changing situations and 
context of the deployment. 3 In an UN Report released in 2000, peace operations were 
defined comprise of three principle activities that are: conflict prevention and peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peace building. 4 
 
Conflict prevention addresses the structural sources of conflicts in order to build a solid 
foundation for peace. This is a low-profile activity and usually in the form of diplomatic 
initiatives. 5 
 
                                                 
1 UN Charter: Preamble and article 1 
2 Chapter 7, UN Charter 
3 Marten Zwanenburg, “Accountability of Peace Support Operations”, page11 
4 UN Doc. A/55/305 – S/2000/809, also referred as Brahimi Report 
5 UN Doc A/55/305 – S/2000/809, par. 10 
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Peace-making addresses conflicts in progress, attempting to bring them to a halt, using the 
tools of diplomacy and mediation. This kind of peace operation can be carried out by 
envoys of governments, group(s) of states, regional organizations or the UN or even by a 
prominent personality. 6 
 
Peace-building is a recent term that are activties undertaken on the far side of conflict to 
reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations 
something that is more than just the absence of war. It may be activities such as 
reintergrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law, 
improving respect for human rights, development, etc.7 
 
Peacekeeping is long time operation that has evolved rapidly in the past decade from a 
traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separation after 
interstates wars (traditional peacekeeping operations, example of this kind can be cited is 
the UNEF I - the First United Nations Emergency Force, that was established in 1956 by 
the General Assembly’s resolution8  to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, 
including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom 
from Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian 
and Israeli forces and to provide impartial supervision of the ceasefire), to incorporate a 
complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in 
the dangerous aftermath of civil wars (multi-dimentional peacekeeping operations, example 
is UNTAC – the UN Transitional Authority  in Cambodia9). 10 
 
The end of the Cold War, the ongoing integration and globalization processes do not bring 
peace and security to all over the World. In constrast, ethnic cleansing, civil wars, regional 
conflicts have been taking place even in more numerous areas all around the globe.11 To 
                                                 
6 UN Doc. A/55/305 – S/2000/809, par. 11 
7 UN Doc. A/55/305 – S/2000/809, par 13 
8 Resolution 998 (ES – I) dated 4 November 1956 
9 The operation was established by the Security Council Resolution 745 (1992). UN Doc. S/RES/745/(1992) 
10 UN Doc. A/55/305 – S/2000/809, par. 12 
11 UN Peacekeeping: A Documentary Introduction, page 31-32 
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stop those tragedies for mankind, the UN,  the most credible and important international 
organization, has increased the deployment of its peace operations.12 On the one hand the 
role of POs in ensuring peace and security is undeniable, but on the other hand there is 
growing reports about criminal violations committed by peacekeepers.13 Should we stop 
deploying POs in order to stop those violations by the troops? the answer is obviously not. 
Can we on the one hand ensure world peace and security and on the other hand ensure 
justice for victims of violations committed by peacekeepers? The thesis will study this 
dilemma. 
 
1.2  Research questions 
 
The thesis will examine the existing mechanism of holding peacekeepers accountable in 
order to find out the strengths and weaknesses of the current mechanism, and based on 
those finding it will study whether and how we can make up a more effective mechanism to 
hold peacekeepers accountable. The main research question is how to better holding 
peacekeepers accountable. This main question will be divided into sub-questions in order to  
get an answer more easily. That are why we need hold peacekeepers accountable? Why we 
need a better mechanism? There has been a mechanism in place but doesn’t it work well? 
why doesn’t it work well? what is the obstacle for it functioning effectively? Why there is 
that obstacle, where it comes from? Can we clear it? And How?  
 
1.3 Scope and limitation of the thesis 
 
The meaning of notion of ”accountable” or ” accountability” is quite broad. In the 
document entitled ”Accountability within Peace Operations”, the International Forum for 
the Challenges of Peace Operations refered to a definition that is: 
 
                                                 
12 Fact and figures about PKOs at website: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm 
13 http://www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/aboutpkwatch.html 
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”Being accountable means explaining one’s actions and inactions and being responsible for 
them. Individuals, organizations and states have to account for their actions. Accountability 
also means that individuals, organizations and states may safely and legitimately report 
concerns and complaints and receive redress where appropriate.”14 
 
Accountability depends on stakeholders one is responsible to, stakeholders have rights to 
know the standards applied and should know the mechanisms so that they can report 
concerns and seek redress if any. Depending on particular peace keeping operations, but 
usually peacekeepers are accountable to the UN (including member states of UN), to their 
home states, the host states, the regional organizations and the general population.15  
  
The Wikipedia Dictionary defines accountability as obligation to inform about (past or 
future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of 
eventual misconduct.16 Accountability may have many senses, it can be political, 
administrative, judicial or professional accountability.  
 
In summary, it can be understood that ”accountability” means to give explaination for your 
actions and to be responsible for, with ”responsible for” it means you will bear both the 
results and consequenses of your acts, and in case of damages happen should remedies or 
reparations be available to compensate for the victims.  
 
In this light, when talking about holding peacekeepers accountable it can be understood 
that we hold peacekeepers give explaination for their acts and eventually in case of their 
acts are violations of laws,  they should be hold responsible or even criminally responsible, 
that is being prosecuted.  So being accountable for is much more than being prosecuted for. 
However, because of time limit this thesis will examine the prosecution of peacekeepers 
                                                 
14 Accountability within Peace Operations, International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, 
website: www.challengesproject.net 
15 Accountability within Peace Operations, International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, 
website: www.challengesproject.net 
 
16 Wikipedia Dictionary 
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only, the ”last stage”  and the ”highest extent” of being accountable, with a focus is on 
analysing the obstacles to the prosecution process with particular on exercising jurisdiction 
aspect, as if a court have no jurisdiction on the case, it is obviously no prosecution are 
taking place and we can not have further discussion on the matter, the obstacle may be both 
legal and factual. Why and where these obstacles come from, the advantage and 
disadvantages in prosecuting peacekeepers by each of them, from that to find out whether 
the existing prosecution systems of peacekeepers work well enough to contribute to the 
holding peacekeepers accountable, are there any loopholes that allow peacekeepers go 
unpunished for their violations and why. Base on those findings it will make 
recommendations for holding peacekeepers accountable more effectively.  
 
With regard to ”peacekeepers”, this may include many kinds of persons such as civilian 
police, health workers, military members, etc those are all participate in peace operation, I 
would like to limit to military members only as they are the main component of peace 
operations and actually most of the allegations on peacekeepers is on the military 
members.17  
 
However, when examining the prosecution of peacekeepers, sometimes the proceedings 
against a military members may relate to other kind of members as well so in such a case I 
will use the definition of UN personnel  as stipulated in the article 1 of the UN Convention 
on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, that is: 
 
 ” (i) persons engaged or deployed by the Secretaty-General of the United Nations as 
members of military, police or civilian components of a United Nations operation; 
(ii) Other officials and experts on mission of the United Nations or its specialized agencies  
... who are present in an official capacity in the area where a United Nations operation is 
being conducted;”18 
 
                                                 
17 Among 105 allegations on sexual abuses brought to the DPKO in 2004, 80 allegations against military 
members, 16 against civilian, and 9 against civilian police. UN Doc. A/59/710, paragraph 9.  
18 The UN Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, article 1 
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As presented above in the Introduction section, there are different kinds of peace 
operations, so I would like to limit myself to the ”peacekeeping operations” only, and 
peacekeeping operations which are established or authorized by the United Nations.  
 
Regarding the violations by peacekeepers, there can be violations of acts within the 
ostensible mandate of the mission which are much more complicated for prosecute, acts 
that are disciplinary offences, or individual criminal acts. Individual criminal acts can be 
either: acts that are criminalized in the majority of States (rape, murder), acts that amount 
to international crimes. This study will focus on violations with a nature of individual 
criminal acts only.   
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis which will be an examination of the prosecution of peacekeeper with a focus on 
analysing obstacles to the prosecution process  will be divided into four parts: Chapter 1 is 
The Introduction will give a reason why I choose this topic, it also draws out the analysis 
framework, the method to be used of the thesis. The second chapter will analyse legal 
framework applicable to PKOs with a focus on the law that will be legal ground for 
prosecution, it also give some feature about the violations of peacekeepers. The third 
chapter will present the prosecution of peacekeepers with concentration on analysing 
obstacles to the prosecution process. The last chapter is Conclusion and Recommendations 
for better keeping peacekeepers accountable.   
 
1.5 Methodology 
 
 
An examination of international laws’s influence on the process of prosecuting 
peacekeepers will be the grounding of the thesis. The analyse of international laws will 
base on the current texts of the law and in light of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
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Treaties. The examination of prosecution process will look into both domestic and 
international court system with focus on aspect of exercising jurisdiction. The examination 
and analysis base mainly on the current texts of international law, however some sources of 
information, critics from some academic works and UN reports also be used.   
2 Chapter 2: Legal framework concerning PKOs. Violations committed by 
peacekeepers.  
 
2.1 Legal framework  
 
When examining whether a machine works well or not, we need to compare the quality of 
the outcome products with the sample one that that machine is expected to produce. When 
examining whether an organization works well or not, we need to see whether that 
organization discharge its tasks completely or not with ”good quality” of course. But as the 
process that an organization carrying its tasks is different from a process that a machine 
producing a product, in which the working environment of that organization can not be 
ommitted or even be taken into account seriously. What constitutes an working 
environment of an organization, one may name such as office, computer, furniture, staff .... 
in short what called as available resources, resources should be seen in a broad sense that is 
including what that organization can do and what it can not, that is the rules and regulations 
binding upon that organization. I think it is similar when we examining the functioning of 
the PKOs, we need to look into the working environment of the PKOs as well, nevertheless 
the ”natural” working environment such as hard weather or intensity of hostilities where 
the PKOs deployed is more or less, in one sense or another is out of our control, what we 
can only do is to provide them some facilitation enabling them carry out their mandates 
better.  Because of that thinking, and because of the fact that the prosecution of 
peacekeepers to certain extent affected by provisions in the laws facilitating peacekeepers’s 
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work, therefore in this section I will present the laws that help peacekeepers to have a better 
working environment, that is giving them legitimacy  and assisting, protecting them while 
carrying out the mandate in addition to the law that governing their conducts which will be 
the legal basis for prosecuting them which the topic of the thesis  needs to adrress 
somewhat.   
 
2.1.1 Laws giving legitimacy to PKOs 
 
2.1.1.1 The UN Charter 
 
In general, for a peacekeeping operation being legitimate, it should bear a mission 
mandated by the UN organization, put it in more practical term, it should be set up or 
authorized by the UN based on the provisions of the Organization’s Charter, in order to 
protect and uphold the goals and objectives, which must not go against the purposes and 
principles set out in the Charter. 
 
The Charter of the United Nations is the main legal document for the organization and 
functioning of the Organization. It is not only the legal ground for the UN to set up a peace 
operation, but also guiding principles for all member states’ conducts in international 
relations. In other word, the Charter is not only giving legitimacy to the Security Council 
actions and  to peace keeping operations, it is a framework for members states in their 
conducts in international relations and ultimately it is for every one (as constituents of 
members states) including peacekeepers to act in compliance with as well.   
 
Under Chapter 6 ”Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, the SC shall call upon the parties to 
settle  their dispute by peaceful means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration (article 33) or the SC can at any stage of a dispute recommend appropriate 
procedures or methods of adjustment (article 36) ... or it may recommend such terms of 
settlement as it may consider appropriate (article 37). 
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 Under the Chapter 7 ”Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, 
and Acts of Aggression”, the SC shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of agrression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken ... (article 39). Should the SC consider that measures provided for 
in article 41 would be inadequate or had proved to be inadequate, it may take action by air, 
sea, or land forces .... to maintain or restore international peace and security (article 42). 
 
Under the Chapter 8 ” Regional Arrangements”, the SC shall, where appropriate, ”utilize 
such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority...” 
(article 53). 
 
The Security Council, bases on those three chapters of the Charter and specific provisions 
mentioned above will decide to take necessary measures which deem appropriate and 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. When the SC decides that a peace 
operation is appropriate and necessary, it will adopt a resolution to set up an operation or to 
give authorization to an operation, this resolution will specify a mandate for that operation 
as well. Therefore, with each of PKO established or authorized by the UN there is a 
resolution adopted by the Security Council accordingly.19 Because of being set up (or 
authorized) by the Security Coucil, a principle organ of the United Nations, PKOs are 
”subsidiary” organ of the UN.20 This legal status, on the one hand make PKOs legitimate 
and  credible, one the other hand will bring difficulties to prosecution process as they are 
accorded immunities and privileges consequently.21  
 
                                                 
19 In 1956, the General Assembly adopted a resolution - resolution 998 (ES – I) dated 4 November 1956 to 
establish UNEF I (the First United Nations Emergency Force) to secure and supervise the cessation of 
hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from 
Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and 
to provide impartial supervision of the ceasefire. But now, this function belongs to the Security Council as 
stipulated in the article 24 of the UN Charter.   
20 Article 29 of the UN Charter states that the SC may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary 
or the performance of its functions.  
21 I will analyse this issue through sections in this thesis.  
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2.1.1.2 The Security Council resolutions 
 
As required by the UN, those resolutions mentioned above must be supported by at least 9 
out of 15 members of the Security Council and without veto by any P5 country (the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of 
China).22 With this kind of resolutions from the Security Council of the UN, a 
peacekeeping operation have its legitimacy, the mission and mandate specified in these 
operation will guide operations of all personnel concerned.  
 
The UN Charter and an authorizing resolution by the Security Council make a 
peacekeeping operation legitimate. In addition to that, to ensure the legitimacy of 
operations, the UN deploys its PKOs in accordance with following principles: consent of 
the parties (parties to the conflict); impartiality, UN force must treat all sides to a conflict 
equally, this principle helps the UN force to have consent of all parties (the first principle); 
non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. Consent, impartiality 
and non-use of force are the basic principles of UN peacekeeping operations which  in turn 
help the peacekeeping operation further upholding its legitimacy. 
 
2.1.2 Laws facilitating peacekeepers’ work 
2.1.2.1 The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations 
 
To facilitate the functioning of the Organization in general, the UN Charter provides that 
the Organization and its officials shall enjoy privileges and immunities as are necessary to 
the independent exercise of their functions (article 105 UN Charter). Stemming from this 
article, the UN General Assembly proposed a draft Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the UN. It was adopted on 13 February 1946 and entered into force on 
                                                 
22 Article 27 of the UN Charter 
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September 17 the same year. As PKOs are subsidiary organs of the UN,  peacekeeping 
operations personnel can enjoy the provisions of this Convention accordingly. 
 
According to this Convention, UN officials and UN experts on Missions shall be given 
immunities that are: 
 
The United Nations officials shall enjoy immunity from legal process in respect of words 
spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity.23  The UN 
experts shall be accorded immunity from personnal arrest or detention and from seizure of 
their personal baggage. In respect of words spoken and written and acts done by them in 
the course of the performance of their mission, immunity from legal process of every kind. 
This immunity from legal process shall continue to be accorded notwithstanding that the 
persons concerned are no longer employed on missions for the United Nations. 24  
 
Those immunities are granted in the interests of the United Nations, for the ease and 
convenience of functioning of the Organization’s mandates, not for personal benefit of the 
individuals themself, so it may be waived. The Secretary-General has the right and the duty 
to waive the immunity in case where it impedes the course of justice and it can be waived 
without prejudice to the interests of the United Nations (Section 20 article 5 and Section 23 
article 6 of the Convention). 
 
Like other international conventions, this Convention are binding on state parties to the 
Convention only. However, this Convention is a basis for further elaboration and 
specification of privileges and immunities of peacekeepers which will be agreed upon 
between the UN and the host state in Status of Force Agreement SOFA.25 
 
                                                 
23 Article V, Section 18, Privileges and Immunities Convention.  
24 Article VI, Section 22, Privileges and Immunities Convention.  
25 A model SOFA is issued in UN Doc A/45/594, Annex I of the thesis, there will be more mentioning on 
SOFA in section of prosecution by the ICC later on.  
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2.1.2.2 The United Nations Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated 
Personnel 
 
The objective of this Convention is to ensure the safety and security of United Nations and 
associated personnel which certainly will help peacekeepers have a better working 
environment. The Convention as considered by Jaume Saura is expansion and update the 
privileges and immunities of UN agents,26  was adopted in 1994 and came into force in 
1999. It specifies crimes against United Nations and associated personnel, that are murder, 
kidnapping, attack on the person or property of the UN, threat to commit attack or attempt 
to commit attack. It calls upon State Party to make those crimes punishable by appropriate 
penalties. The Convention  defines the duties of the state: (i) to ensure safety of UN 
personnel; (ii) to release detained personnel and  treat consistent with Geneva Convention 
until release; (iii) to prosecute or extradite offenders (articles 13, 14, 15).  
 
The Convention also specifies responsibilities of States Parties to cooperate in the 
prevention of the crimes against United Nations and associated personnel (article 11, 16), 
to establish jurisdiction over those crimes (article 10) as well as provides that a Status of 
Force Agreement (SOFA) should soon be concluded between the host state and the UN 
with provisions on privileges and immunities for military and police components of the 
operation (article 4). 
 
The adoption of the Convention proves a complexity of the UN peacekeeping operations, it 
requires law to facilitate the personnel who participating in those operations to work, that is 
the Convention on  Immunities and Privileges, but that seems not enough, a law to protect 
them is needed as well.  
 
                                                 
26 Jaume Saura, “ Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability of IHL to UN PKOs”, Hastings Law Journal, Vol 58, 
495 2006 - 2007 
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The Convention shall not apply to the peace enforcement operation where the personnel are 
engaged as combatants and to which the law of international armed conflicts applies.27 
However the article 6 of the Convention states that the UN and associated personnel shall 
respect the laws and regulations of the host States ...28and article 20 said that nothing in this 
Convention shall affect the applicability of IHL and universally recognized standards of 
human rights ....29. This create an ambiguity about whether the IHL may be applicable 
when the Convention itself applies.30  
 
2.1.3 Laws regulating conducts of peacekeepers 
 
This third component will also be legal basis for prosecuting peacekeepers   
 
2.1.3.1 International Human Rights law 
 
The UN (the Department of Peackeeping Operations - DPKO) has set out Norms of 
Conduct for peacekeeping personnel, and recently they have published ”The United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines” to provide guidelines for its 
personnel.31 According to those principles and guidelines, ”the UN PKOs should be 
conducted in full respect of human rights and should advance human rights through 
implementation of their mandates”, ”the UN peacekeeping personnel  - whether militaty, 
police or civilian – should act in accordance with international human rights law and ... 
                                                 
27 Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Convention on the Safety of the United Nations and Associated Personnel 
28 Article 6, paragraph 1 (a) of the Convention on the Safety of the United Nations and Associated Personnel 
29 Article 20, Savings Clauses, of the Convention on the Safety of the United Nations and Associated 
Personnel. 
30 Jaume Saura, “ Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability of IHL to UN PKOs”, Hastings Law Journal, Vol 58, 
2006 - 2007 
31 Available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf 
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peacekeeping personnel should strive to ensure that they do not become perpetrators of 
human rights abuses...... when they comit abuses, they should be held accountable”.32 
 
In fact, there is difference between laws, rules and guidelines, principles. While laws and 
rules are legally binding, it means if you violate laws and rules, you will be prosecuted or 
held accountable in other word. Guidelines and principles are in fact not binding, they are 
close to recommended behaviours, and generally one can not be prosecuted for not 
following the recommended behaviours. Human rights law has a special character that is 
obligations are binding on states (states are duty bearers) not on individuals. When we talk 
about violations or human rights violations in particular, generally it means there are 
violations of relating laws. When we say that there is violation of laws, usually it implies 
that there is something prohibited or not allowed by the laws has happened. However, in 
fact human rights are usually expressed  in the form of entitlement, not in the form of 
prohibition.  So in case of human rights violations in particular, there are two scenarios: (i) 
the rights holders’ entitlement do not exist, in this case the State will be accounted for; (ii) 
the entitlement of the rights holders do exist but is violated, not 100% but usually in this 
case there is a crime has been committed, and those crimes we can see being stipulated in 
other laws such as criminal law, in this case the State discharges its duty by bringing the 
perpetrator to the court. For example, the right to life is a human right. But this right is 
expressed in the form of entitlement, that is ”Every human being has the inherent right to 
life”33. When there is a murder, we can say there is violation of the right to life. Killing, 
murder are prohibited or punishable under the criminal law.34 So when talking about 
violations of human rights law, especially in the context of this thesis, I would mean the 
second scenario, that there is a commission of crime and that crime violates a right or rights 
of human being, and that might also be the meaning of the ”human rights  abuses” in the 
above quotation of the UN guidelines and principles I guess. With that sense, the 
perpetrator should be punishable accordingly under the (criminal) laws. In summary, 
                                                 
32 UN publication in 2008 ”The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines”, page 
14 -15 
33 The article 6 of the ICCPR 
34 Articles 6,7,8 of the ICC Statute all specify that killing, murder are acts of crimes 
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human rights obligations are binding upon states, they also have binding effects on non- 
state actors.35 
 
In peace operations, the significance of human rights obligations may be seen under three 
different aspects: 
 
”Ideally, there would be an express mandate by the Security Council and/or a regional 
organization requesting not only all parties to the conflict, but also the peacekeeping force 
to protect human rights. 
 
Even where such commitment has not been expressly stated, peace oprerations are to 
respect the law of the receiving state including its obligations under international law of 
which human rights are important part. 
 
Finally, the human rights obligations of the sending state apply extraterritorially for acts 
committed within their jurisdiction”. 36 
 
To conclude about applicability of human rights law to peacekeeping operations, I want to 
make a quotation, that is” whether or not international humanitarian law applies to 
peacekeeping operations, such operations have a continuing duty to respect the general 
international law of human rights.”37 that means whenever and whereever possible, 
peacekeeping operations are abind by human rights law. 
 
2.1.3.2 International humanitarian law (IHL) 
 
                                                 
35 The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, Second Edition, 2008, Oxford University Press, Section 
258 
36 The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, Second Edition, 2008, Oxford University Press,  
Section 1307 
37 Jaume Saura, “ Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability of IHL to UN PKOs”, Hastings Law Journal, Vol 58, 
488 2006 - 2007 
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There has been for a long time discussion about the applicability of the IHL to the UN 
forces.38  With the issuance of the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on 6 August 1999 entitled: 
”Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law”39, the question 
have a clear answer already, that is yes the IHL applies to the UN forces. Now the question 
is that how and to what extent the IHL is applied to the UN forces, the degree of 
responsibility etc. 
 
 With the length of about 3 pages, the Bulletin surely does not and can not mention all 
aspects of the applicability of the IHL to the UN forces. The Section 1 of this Bulletine 
reaffirmed that ”the fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set 
out in the present bulletin are applicable to ...”, this affirmation gives an idea that the UN 
forces will be bound by international humanitarian law, at least to those rules stated in the 
Bulletin.  
 
Section 3 of the Bulletin provides that ”the force shall conducts its operations with full 
respect for the principles and rules of the general conventions applicable to the conduct of 
military personnel”. ”The obligation to respect these principles shall be applicable even in 
the absence of a status of forces agreement. The UN is also to undertake to ensure members 
of military personnel of the force are fully acquainted with the principles and rules of those 
international instruments”. In the context that international organizations are not parties to 
international conventions and whether international conventions are binding upon them is 
still under discussion with different points of views, it can be said that the Secretary-
General’s Bulletin is a ”strong” affirmation that the IHL will bind on UN  forces.40 
 
In sections 5,6,7,8,9 of the Bulletin, the Secretary-General sets out responsibilities of the 
UN force in more specific. 
 
                                                 
38 Marten Zwanenburg, “Accountability of Peace Support Operations”, page 159 - 165 
39 UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 
40 Marten Zwanenburg in “Accountability of Peace Support Operations” even quoted that the Bulletine signal 
”formal recognition of the applicability of International Humanitarian Law to United Nations peace 
operations”. Marten Zwanenburg, “Accountability of Peace Support Operations”, page 173.  
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Section 5 is about the responsiblility regarding protection of the civilian population, 
whereby attacks on civilians or civilian objects are prohibited (section 5, par 1). The UN 
force shall take all feasible precautions to avoid, minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians or damage to civilian property (section 5, par.3). The UN force shall not 
engage in reprisals against civilians or civilian objects (section 5, par.6).  
 
Section 6 is about means and methods of combat. It stipulates that the UN force shall 
respect the rules prohibiting or restricting the use of certain weapons and methods of 
combat under the relevant instruments of international humanitarian law (section 6, par 2). 
The UN force is prohibited from employing methods of warfare, weapons or methods of 
combat that may cause superfuous injury or unnecessary suffering (section 6, par 3, 4). 
Other paragraphs of the section prohibit the UN force from attacking or destroying cultural 
objects or objects that are essential to the survival of civilian population such as foodstuff, 
crops, drinking-water installations... the UN force shall not engage in reprisals against 
those objects. Relating to this section, there is another UN Convention regulating the means 
of warefare, that is the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which may be Deemed to be Excessively injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects (1980). In the spirit of this Bulletine, the UN force also abides itself 
to the Convention.  
 
Section 7 is about treatment of civilians and persons hors de combat. Paragraph 2 of this 
section clearly states that ” the following acts against any of the persons mentioned in par.1 
are prohibited at any time and in any place: violence to life or physical integrity; murder as 
well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; 
collective punishment; reprisals; the taking of hostage; rape; enforced prostitution; any 
form of sexual assaults and humiliation and degrading treatment; enslavement; and 
pillage.” (section 7, par.2).  
 
Section 8 and 9 is about responsibilities of the UN force in treatment of detained persons 
and protection of the wounded, the sick, and medical and relief personnel.  
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 The Bulletin also specifies the jurisdiction in case violation of international humanitarian 
law happens. In section 4, it said: ” In case of violations of international humanitarian law, 
members of the military personnel of a United Nations force are subject to prosecution in 
their national courts.” This regulation on jurisdiction is reiterated in the Memorandum of 
Understanding between Troops Contributing Country and the UN.41  
 
One negative point of the Bulletin is that it specifies a very narrow scope of application of 
the IHL to the UN forces, that is ”in situations of armed conflict they (the UN forces) are 
actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their 
engagement”42 Does this mean in other situations when the UN forces are not active 
combatants they will not be abind by the IHL? 
 
Another negative point of the Bulletin is it states only few norms that applied to the UN 
forces. There are many other important norms that it does not mention for example: 
concerning treatment of war prisoners, rules of occupation, duty to ensure respect, norms 
applied in non-international armed conflicts ...43 
 
In discussing about that two negative points, I want to give an example: a peacekeeping 
operation is deployed in a country, a ceasefire has been reached between belligerent parties 
in that country, there sometimes may have breaches of the ceasefire but the general 
atmosphere is ”peaceful” in other words, there is not many chances for peacekeepers 
become ”active combatants”. A peacekeeper of that operation attacking a local civilian. 
Does the IHL applied in this case or not? is it allowed for that peacekeeper attacking local 
civilian in case the IHL does not apply? I raise this example because as I stated in the 
section on scope of the thesis that I will focus on violations of individual peacekeeper 
                                                 
41 A model of MOU is in Annex II, UN Doc. A/46/185 (23 May 1991) 
42 The SG’s Bulletin, Section 1, paragraph 1 
43 For more discussion on these, see Jaume  Saura, “ Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability of IHL to UN 
PKOs”, Hastings Law Journal, Vol 58,  2006 - 2007 
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which are of criminal nature only.  I will not discuss circumstances that the responsibility is 
attribute to the UN as a whole.  
 
We may hear some people call humanitarian law is the law of armed conflicts. To me I 
prefer to look at humanitarian law in relation to human kind, that is if human rights law is 
the law governing the treatment of human beings in general, humanitarian law is the law 
governing the treatment of non-combatants. Regarding the binding nature I can revoke to 
the customary nature of international humanitarian law as well as opinions of many 
scholars.44 In summary, the fact that one country is not party to HRs conventions or HL 
conventions does not mean that country can mal-treat human beings or non-combatants. 
Whenever and wherever you mal-treat a human being, you violate human rights law, 
whenever and whenever you mal-treat a non-combatant, you violate humanitarian law, and 
you should be held accountable for that breach of the law. 
 
In conclusion, the norms of humanitarian law should be applied whenever and whenever 
possible to the UN forces, 45 and I think we can see that spirit in the Bulletin if we see what 
is stated in the Section 3, that is ” the UN undertakes to ensure that those force shall 
conduct its operations with full respect for the principles and rules of the general 
conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel”,46 and the affirmation by the 
Bulletin that some norms will apply ”at any time and in any place”. 47  
          
2.1.3.3  International Criminal Law (ICL) 
 
                                                 
44 Jaume  Saura, “ Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability of IHL to UN PKOs”, Hastings Law Journal, Vol 58, 
499-500  2006 - 2007 
45 Jaume  Saura in “ Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability of IHL to UN PKOs”, Hastings Law Journal, Vol 
58,  530 2006 – 2007 said that “ Blue helmets must respect and ensure respect IHL norms in every situation 
that calls for its application” “the only limitation on the UN’s obligations lies in those areas where the 
Organization is truly materially impossible to discharge…” 
46 The SG’s Bulletin. UN Doc. ST/SBG/1999/13, Section 3. 
47 The SG’s Bulletin. UN Doc. ST/SBG/1999/13, Section 7. paragraph 7.2 
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The international human rights law and international humanitarian law on the one hand 
give rights to rights-holders and on the other hand setting obligations (norms and standards 
that duty-bearers must apply and respect) for duty-bearers, they provide rules and 
principles regulating conducts of actors involved and in case of this thesis are 
peacekeepers.48 The International Criminal Law is to proscribe international crimes and 
impose obligations on States to prosecute and punish perpetrators of those crimes, 
regulating the proceedings of the prosecution and trial.49 Therefore, by its nature, ICL is 
mechanism to enforce international human rights and humanitarian laws. ICL does not set 
norms and standards for peacekeepers’ conducts but it may get peacekeepers involved in 
cases where violations of peacekeepers amounting to ”international crimes”50.  
 
2.1.3.4  Mission mandate, Norms of Conducts for peacekeeping personnel, 
Rules of Engagement, Laws of host country 
 
The UN Charter, human rights, humanitarian laws are common things that all peacekeepers 
of all operations should have to observe during their terms of duty. They are embodied in 
the form of guidelines, directives, bulletines, resolutions, rules of the UN and the Secretary-
General. In addition, each peackeeping operation is deployed in a particular environment 
with particular ends, those particularities are reflected in the operation’s mission and 
mandate,51 and peacekeepers are supposed to know, understand and discharge the mission 
mandate of the operation that they are participating in.  
 
                                                 
48 Some may argue that duty-bearers of international human rights law are states, however in case violations 
committed by non-state actors, states will exercise its “protect” obligation, so in one sense or another other 
non-state actors also have to bear the duty of human rights law that is to respect human rights of others. With 
regards to IHL, the same token can be applied as the common article 1 states that the High Contracting Parties 
undertake “ to respect” and to “ensure respect”….  
49 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003)  page 15 
50 international crimes are crimes are the most serious crimes which concern the whole international 
community and universally recognized as criminal and can not be left exclusively to jurisdiction of one state. 
Cassese (2003) page 23-24 
51  Mission mandate is usually stated in the SC resolution setting up or authorizing the operation.  
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Further more, according to ”Norms of Conducts for peacekeeping personnel”, 
peacekeepers are required not only respect human rights and humanitarian norms, they are 
supposed to ”respect the law of the land of the host country, their local culture, traditions, 
customs and practices” as well.52 
 
There are other rules that peacekeepers shall have to follow, that is Rules of Engagement 
(ROE), ROE provides guidance for peacekeeper to use force, normally it is restricted to 
self-defence only. Self-defence should ensure the proportionality, that is the minimum use 
of force and to minimize the potential damage. 
 
2.1.3.5 Domestic laws (laws of the host state, laws of home states or third 
states) 
 
As mentioned in previous part, peacekeepers are required to respect the laws of host 
country.  They are also subject to the national laws of their own country during his tour of 
duty (criminal, military laws ....) as they are considered still remain in their national 
service.53     
 
In conclusion,  the legal framework regulating conducts of peacekeepers is quite rich and 
complete but how the prosecution process be undertaken? I will touch on this problem in 
following  parts. 
 
2.2 Violations committed by peacekeepers  
 
Violations can be in many kinds such as dispropotionate use of force that is in one way or 
another and to some extent relating to mandate of the PKO in question, individual’s 
                                                 
52 Rule 2, Ten Rules Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/Conduct/ten_in.pdf 
53 MOU between the UN and the troops contributing countries. UN Doc. A/46/185, part V, par. 7 
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misconduct (ex. Rape, murder, torture, smuggling) that  might be of criminal in character 
or at least of disciplinary character. In fact, from different sources so far, allegations of 
violations of all kinds by peacekeepers have been revealed .  
 
On Wednesday, 23 May 2007, the BBC released article about Pakistani peacekeepers 
involved in traded gold and sold weapons and sold weapons to Congolese militia groups 
they were meant to disarm.  
 
In 1997, the media reported on alleged allegations of torture by UN peacekeepers in 
Somali. In a photograph, two Belgian soldiers holding a Somali child over an open flame. 
In other cases, UN soldiers kicking and stabbing a Somalian, another shows a Somalian 
child being forced to drink salt water, vomit and worms. There were allegations that a 
Somalian child was placed in a metal container and withheld water for two days, afterward 
the child died.54 
 
Another case is about Canadian soldiers beating death a 16-year-old Somalian boy named 
Shidane Arone, three peacekeepers had been photographed smiling beside the bloody 
corpse of the boy, whose hand had been bound.55 
 
Drunkenness, black marketeering, involving prostitution including child prostitution are 
among other allegations on peacekeepers.56 Allegations about sexual abuses by 
peacekeepers is so widespread and serious such as situation in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo as the Secretary-General has to request his Special Adviser on Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operation to make report on the 
matter and recommend measures to stop the phenomena. 
 
                                                 
54 “Beasts in Blue Berets” available at 
http://ww.whatreallyhappened.com/RANCHO/POLITICS/UN/peace.html 
55 “Beasts in Blue Berets” available at http:// 
www.whatreallyhappened.com/RANCHO/POLITICS/UN/peace.html 
56 Information at: http://www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/pknews.html 
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And most recently on 27 May 2008, BBC and Save Children of UK reported a case that 10 
peacekeepers had gang-raped a 13 year old girl in Ivory Coast. 
 
So the cause of stopping violations of peacekeepers seems not easy and far-reaching, we 
are surely in urgent need of a more effective mechanism to held peacekeepers accountable. 
How the current mechanism works? Specifically about the prosecution mechanism of 
violated peacekeepers will be the content of the next part.   
 
3 Chapter 3:  Prosecution process 
 
Keeping peacekeepers accountable means we keep them giving explaination for their acts 
and eventually in case of their acts are violations of laws,  they should be hold responsible 
for those acts.  The responsibility may be administrative (being disciplined or remove from 
positions), financial (paying a fine, compensation...) or criminal  if the acts constituted a 
crime in accordance to applicable laws, that is being prosecuted by a court. So prosecution 
is a measure to keep peacekeepers accountable criminally. In this chapter I will examine 
that measure. However, I will not go into details about technique of the prosecution that are 
how to investigate, collect evidence, proof, interview witnesses, stages of proceedings, ... in 
stead, as mentioned earlier in chapter 1,  I will discuss on the difficulties of prosecution of 
peacekeepers by national and international courts that is national courts of host countries, 
national courts of home countries and the International Criminal Court (ICC), why and 
where these difficulties come from, with a focus on how does the legal framework around 
the PKOs mentioned above affect the prosecution process. My reason for doing so is that 
we can only improve the current mechanism or set up a more effective mechanism if we 
know well about whether the current mechanisms work, the flaws and weaknesses of the 
current mechanism, and the reason why and from where that flaws and weaknesses come 
from. The reason of my focus on impacts of applicable laws on the prosecution is that laws 
 23
is an area that changes from time to time, we have witnessed the codification process since 
the beginning of human society, and we have witnessed the development of how laws are 
interpreted and applied in reality as well, that development helps laws become more and 
more instrumental in governing society and in safeguarding human rights in the end. The 
community we are living in is a loving peace and justice community, will definitely bring 
those who violate the rights of others to trial regardless of their nationalities and the place 
of crimes (but when?), with that determination, mechanisms for prosecution of perpetrators 
in general and peacekeepers in particular have in place already, that prosecution 
mechanisms comprise of namely: national courts (of the host states and of home states 
(troops contributing states) and the International Criminal Court. The question now is 
whether the existing mechanisms work well and effectively enough to ensure that all those 
who violated the laws be held accountable criminally.  I hope a clear answer will be found 
at the end of this chapter. 
 
I will go from one to another of these courts in the following part. 
3.1 Prosecution by national courts  
 
The United Nations is not a sovereign state, its personnel come from member countries. As 
mentioned in previous sections, the troops of the UN PKOs come from different member 
states of the UN and they are remain under purview of their home state and when a 
peacekeeper committed an acts of violation of the law, usually his home state will be the 
first and primary party to exercise jurisdiction over the case.   
 
3.1.1 National courts of home country 
 
In fact, there are many instances where allegations of violations by peacekeeper have been 
investigated and prosecuted by courts of their home countries. The basis for national courts 
of home state to exercise jurisdiction on peacekeepers is very favourable. It is all stated in 
the Secretary-General’s Bulletin, in the SOFA, in the MOU that the home country will 
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exercise jurisdiction over offences of its contributing troops, especially the members of 
military contingent. To analyse the difficulties for courts of home state in prosecuting 
peacekeepers, I would like to take example as cases Canadian soldiers mentioned in the 
part on violations of peacekeepers.  
 
In that case, after the revelation of the Canadian soldiers’ violations in Somalia by public 
media, at first the Minister of National Defence of Canada ordered a military board of 
inquiry to deal with the cases but as the work of the military board was undertaken behind 
closed door, it had been criticized by public opinion.  Therefore, later on the Government 
of Canada set up the Canadian Commission of Inquiry into Deployment of Canadian 
Forces to Somalia. In facts, the case was transfered from military court to civilian court for 
adjudication. In its letter sent to the United Nations Independent Expert on the situation of 
human rights in Somalia Ms. Mona Rishmawi of 10 December 1997, the Government of 
Canada provided that ”nine Forces members ranging in rank from private to lieutenant-
colonel were charged for a variety of offences from murder and torture to negligent 
performance of military duty. Four Forces members were convicted of offences related to 
the incident in Somalia, three of whom served time in prison. Five members were released 
from the Canadian Force and ten others were subject to other administrative career 
action.”57 
 
The Commission of Inquiry had carried out inquirying work of not only the disciplinary of 
violated soldiers, it undertook a broad examination of the operations, actions and decisions 
or the Canadian forces and the actions and decisions of the Department of National 
Defence in respect of the Canadian forces’ deployment to Somalia, in July 1997 it released 
a report of about 2000 pages58 with many recommendations of which two are relevant to be 
noted here that are: (i) To reform the military justice system by, inter alia, excluding 
military police from the chain of command and substituting civilian judges for military 
judges and (ii) To keep close watch on possible racist influences in the forces. 
                                                 
57 Quoted in UN document E/CN.4/1998/96 
58 Available at website: http://www.forces.gc.ca/somalia/ 
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 The Government of Canada confirmed that the Minister of National Defence of Canada 
agreed with most of the recommendations and the Department of National Defence has 
implemented or is planning to implement a large number of changes.”59  
 
The Government of Canada was commended for its efforts to deal with the violations of its 
soldiers in operation in Somalia, making public of the report. However, there are still 
concerns and questions that are, the Inquiry Commission was given very short time to 
finish a heavy workload so could it could make a fully and properly careful investigation of 
the cases? some even say that the report is a ”strategy of calculated deception”.60 
 
Taking into consideration all those contradictary opinions on the efforts of the Canadian 
Government in assure justice for the Somalian victims, I want to make some remarks about 
prosecution of peacekeepers by courts of home country, that are: 
 
(i) The case of Somalia is so serious and attracted great attention from mass media, 
especially in this case the home country is Canada where the civil society is 
quite active and they put hard pressure on the Canadian Government. So both 
the UN and the home country are under pressure to give answer to the public 
about the measures undertaken against the perpetrators. What about other cases? 
In facts, the number of allegations reported by NGOs on peacekeepers’ 
violations are much more higher than the number of cases disciplined or 
prosecuted by the UN and home states, we can easily hear that information from 
mass media. 
(ii) In this case, it can be said that the Canadian Government had dealt with its 
seriousness, at first it was handled by military then it was transfered to civil 
court. The victims were interviewed and could participate in the prosecution. 
However, in fact if the trials are undertaken in the home states, expenses for the 
                                                 
59 Quoted at UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/96 
60 UN doc. E/CN.4/1998/96 
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victims to travel to the home country of peacekeepers to participate in the trial is 
a problem, the linguistic, cultural differences between the two countries, all of 
these factors will make difficult for victim’s participation in the prosecution 
undertaken by courts of the home country of peacekeepers. In addition, the 
prosecution of peacekeepers at home country are usually carried out by military 
courts where the information of prosecution process is not easy accessible for 
the public.  
(iii) As the victims’s country and the country of trial are not the same, given the 
geographical distance, the liguistic differences, are the victims informed about 
the punishment that the perpetrators were given?  
(iv) Theoretically and factually, there are differences in legal systems between 
countries. An act can be a crime punishable in one country but not in the others. 
The procedures for prosecution may also vary from country to country. The 
different systems will surely create difficulties for the investigation agencies of 
the home country to do their job properly.   
 
From those remarks, I want to sum up the difficulties for national courts of the home 
country in prosecuting peacekeepers that are: (i) the difficulty in collecting evidence, 
interviewing witnesses, enabling witness participating in trial .... this difficulty comes from 
the geographical distance, from linguistic differences or it may be categorized as difficulty 
because of financial restraint; (ii) difficulty because of differences of legal system between 
countries, this technical difficulty can be solved in certain circumstances by legal 
cooperation between countries, for example in investigation. But in other circumstances it 
is quite difficult as in case an acts is considered a crime in one country but not in others, 
this required a uniformity in penal codes of countries and to me it is a far-reaching future; 
(iii)  difficulty because of lack of willingness from the home state, this political difficulty 
can be solved by requesting the troops contributing country to make an committment when 
contributing troops or even the UN make the discipline and prosecution of violated 
peacekeepers as an obligation to the troops contributing countries.  
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3.1.2  National courts of the host country  
 
In addition to national courts of home country, as peacekeeping operations are deployed in 
a country rather than home country of peacekeepers. Peacekeepers are required to observe 
the laws of the host country as well.61 So in case peacekeepers violate the law of the host 
state, he/she can be prosecuted by national courts of the host states as well.   
 
However, according to provisions in the SOFA, the host country can initiate a civil 
proceeding against a member of the UN peace-keeping operation if that the Special 
Representative/Commander certified that the proceeding is not related to official duties.62 
For example a peacekeeper when driving a truck making an accident that killed one civilian 
of the host state, and this is a crime under the law of the host state. If the host state wants to 
initiate a proceedings against that peacekeeper driver, it must inform the Head of Mission 
(Special Representative/ Commander) with the evidence of the case. If the Special 
Representative/Commander certifies that as the peacekeeper was on duty when he driving 
the truck, carrying goods of the UN for example, the host state can not continue with the 
proceedings, but if the Special Representative/ Commander after making an inquiry upon 
information provided by the host country, certifies that the peacekeeper at the time of 
making accident was off duty, the proceeding may be instituted against that peacekeeper 
with agreement of the Head of Mission.  
 
Regarding to military members, the jurisdiction is exclusive to the courts of home states. 
This is stated in the Secretary-General Bulletin on Observance of IHL by UN peacekeeping 
personnel, in SOFA and MOU.63  
 
                                                 
61 As previously mentioned in section on legal framework 
62 Par.49, model of SOFA 
63 Analyse on provisions on jurisdiction in SOFA, MOU, SG’s Bulletin in sections on applicable laws and 
prosecution by the ICC.  
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In short, the jurisdiction of the host state’ national courts on peacekeepers in general is 
limited because of the procedure mentioned above in the SOFA, and absolutely excluded 
with regard to military members.  
 
3.2 Prosecution by the International Criminal Court 
 
With determination to put an end to impunity of perpetrators of those crimes, the 
international community agreed to set up a permanent court, that is International Criminal 
Court.64 However, the Court serves as complementary to national courts only (only in cases 
where national court is unable or unwilling to do the prosecution job),65 therefore for the 
ICC to have jurisdiction over peacekeepers, there must be: (i) first of all, crime committed 
must be amounting to international crimes and taking place after the entry into force of the 
ICC Statute; (ii) the concerned countries (host countries, troop contributing countries, the 
countries where crimes taking place) are States Parties of the Court Statute; (iii) the 
national court in those cases are not able or willing to prosecute the perpetrator genuinely. 
Given all those requirements are met, however there are still impediments for the ICC to 
exercise jurisdiction over peacekeepers both legally and technically because of the result of 
legal status of the PKOs, the immunities given to peacekeepers consequently as well as 
some special charisteristics of an UN operation. To be more specific, that impediments may 
arise from the immunities accorded to the UN forces, that are stipulated in the SOFA, 
provisions on jurisdiction in the Memorandum of Understanding between Troops 
contributing country and the UN (MOU),  or it may arise from the Security Council 
resolutions ( I will refer to and analyse resolutions 1422 and 1487 specifically), or from the 
special characteristics of the chain of command of UN PKOs. In addition to the such 
impediments, there may also be some limitations on the ICC’s jurisdiction over 
peacekeepers as a result of the crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction are not so numerous as 
                                                 
64 The Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble paragraph 
65 The Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble paragraph 
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stipulated by the Rome  Statute. In the following I will go through those impediments  and 
limitations one by one.  
3.2.1 The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) and their impacts on the ICC’s jurisdiction over 
peacekeepers 
 
3.2.1.1  The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 
 
SOFA is a legal document between the UN and the host country which defines the status of 
a peacekeeping operation and its members. A standard form of SOFA issued by the UN is 
in Annex I.  A real SOFA may have some modification as a result of negotiation process 
between the UN and the host  state, and in case that a SOFA has not been concluded, the 
model would apply provisionally.66 One of important parts of SOFA is provisions on the 
immunities and privileges which will be accorded to the peacekeeping operation personnel, 
usually the Special Representative of the Secretary-General or head of mission, the Force 
Commander and some other high-ranking members of the operation are given privileges 
and immunities as of diplomatic envoys as stipulated in article V, Section 18 of the General 
Convention on Immunities and Privileges.67 In addition, model SOFA provides ”functional 
immunity” to the operation’s personnel, that is immunity accorded to peacekeepers 
provisionally with respect to their words or acts in performance of their mission.68 In 
essence, the UN forces will be given immunity from legal process in respect of words 
spoken or written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity.  
 
In addition to provisions on privileges and immunities accorded to the operation’s 
personnel, the SOFA also provides legal framework for jurisdiction concerning members of 
the UN PKO (from par.46 to par.50 of the model of SOFA).  
                                                 
66 General Assembly Resolution 52/12 B of 9 January 1998, UN Doc. A/RES/52/12 b, par.7 
67 Par.24 of model SOFA 
68 Par. 26 of model SOFA and its reference to article VI of the Convention.  
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 According to paragraph 49, any civil proceeding is instituted against a member of the 
United Nations peace-keeping operation before any court of (host country/territory), should 
be notified to the Special Representative/Force Commander immediately, and he shall 
certify to the court whether or not the proceeding is related to the official duties of such 
member. If the proceeding is related to official duties, such proceeding shall be 
discontinued.  SOFA also set out a mechanism to settle disputes between the UN and the 
host state (paragraph 51), whereby a standing claims commission shall be set up with one 
member from UN, one member from the host state, and co-chaired by the Secretary-
General and the Government, ... in fact this is a time consuming mechanism and of little 
help.  
 
Further more, the article 47 requires the Government (of the host state) to inform and 
present evidence of criminal offence when it considers that any member of the United 
Nations peace-keeping operations has committed a criminal offence. Based on that 
information, the Special Representative/Commander will conduct inquiry of the case and 
agree with the Government about should the proceeding be initiated.  
 
The immunities stipulated in the SOFA and the procedures for initiating a proceedings 
mentioned above obviously will hinder the ICC and national courts as well (national courts 
of the host state) from prosecuting peacekeepers.   
3.2.1.2 Memorandum of Understanding between the UN and troops 
contributing countries (MOU) 
 
As the UN does not have a force of itself, so whenever an peace operation to be set up, the 
UN will request member state to contribute personnel for that operation. MOU is an 
agreement concluded between the UN and the contributing countries about the category 
and number of personnel that countries will contribute. It specifies the duties of both sides 
(the UN and the contributing countries) with regard to the contribution. A model of this 
agreement is in UN document A/46/185 dated 23 May 1991 (Annex 2) 
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 In MOU, there is provision on jurisdiction, that: 
 
”Question relating to allegations of criminal offence and civil liability of personnel 
provided by (the Participating State) shall be settled in accordance with the procedures 
provided for in the Status Agreement. 
 
(The Participating State) agrees to exercise jurisdiction with respect to crimes or offences 
which may be committed by its military personnel serving with (the United Nations peace-
keeping operation). (The Participating State) shall keep the Head of Mission informed 
regarding the outcome of such exercise of jurisdiction.”69 
 
Even though a real  MOU between the UN and a troops contributing country may have 
modifications as from the above model, but the provision on jurisdiction is almost be kept 
the same. It means the troops contributing state will exercise jurisdiction in case of criminal 
offence of military personnel provided by it. It means jurisdiction of the ICC on cases of 
criminal offence by military personnel of an UN PKOs is excluded by MOU.  
 
3.2.2  The Security Resolutions 1422 and 1487  and their impacts on the 
ICC’s jurisdiction over peacekeepers 
 
Right after entry into force of the Rome Statute on 1 July 2002, on 12 July 2002 the 
Security Council, at its 4572th meeting adopted Resolution 1422 under the Chapter VII of 
the Charter (which means the resolution had binding effects), with the main content, as 
stipulated in the operative par.1: 
 
”1. Request, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC, 
if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State 
                                                 
69 UN Doc. A/46/185 dated 23 May 1991, Part VIII, par. 24, 25.  
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not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations 
established or authorized operation, shall for a twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 
not commence or proceed with investigation or prosecution of any such case, unless the 
Security Council decides otherwise;”70 
 
One year after, on 12 June 2003, the Security Council adopted the Resolution 1487 that is 
the renewal of the resolution 1422. 
 
With the adoption of those two resolution, obviously the SC had bound the hands of the 
ICC in relation to cases concerning individuals from contributing states participating in UN 
operations. . . In fact, right after the adoption of those resolution, there have been 
contronversy and challeges about the legitimacy of the two resolutions, some of the 
opinions is that the resolutions are ultra-vires acts of the Security Council and therefore 
should be null et void.71 However, as the ”suspension” period mentioned in those 
resolutions was only 12 months, and if there is no renewal of those resolutions, there are no 
longer effects directly from the resolutions on the ICC. But the adoption of those 
resolutions are the proof of a fact that some countries do not want their citizens 
participating in UN operations are prosecuted by the ICC, this ”do not want” still exists, we 
can see its existance through provisions in following enabling resolutions of the Security 
Council (resolution deciding to set up or authorize an operation), for example the Security 
Council 1497 dated 1 August 2003 setting up a Multinational Force in Liberia provided 
that:  
 
”Decides that current or former officials or personnel from a contributing state, which is 
not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, shall be subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing state for all alleged acts or ommissions arising 
out of or related to the Multinational Force or United Nations Stabilization Force in 
                                                 
70 UN Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002), par. 1 
71 For more discussion on resolution 1422 and 1487, see “The prosecution and Defense of peacekeepers under 
international criminal law”, Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, Transnational Publisheers, 2004 
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Liberia, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing 
state;”72  
 
In fact, the wording in the Resolution 1497 is even stronger than those in Resolutions 1422 
and 1487 in term of excluding the ICC’s jurisdiction on cases of peacekeeper, it valids 
permanently unless the troop contributing state expressed waive of its exclusive 
jurisdiction.  
 
  
3.2.3  The special characteristic of chain of command of UN peacekeeping 
operations, a technical impediment for the ICC in exercising 
jurisdiction over some peacekeepers 
 
(Even though I present this obstacle in the section on prosecution by the ICC, but it is the 
obstacle for national courts as well.) 
 
The Rome Statute provides general principles of criminal law that are namely inter alia: 
nullum crimen sine lege ( a person shall not be criminally responsible ... unless the conduct 
in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court)73, the individual criminal responsibility ( a person who commits a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in 
accordance with this Statute)74, Responsibility of commanders and other superiors ( A 
military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be 
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces 
under his or her effective command and control), 75 mental element and grounds for 
excluding criminal responsibility... 
                                                 
72 UN Doc. S/RES/1497 (2003), Operative par.7 
73 Article 22 of the Rome Statute 
74 Article 25 of the Rome Statute 
75 Article 28 of the Rome Statute 
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 In short, there is a general principle is that a person shall be prosecuted by the court 
individually only if he/she have committed actus reus (guilty acts) with a mens rea (guilty 
mind) and no defence for those guilty acts. It’s the same for a peacekeeper.   
 
For individual peacekeepers who has committed a guilty acts, the ICC faces impediments 
in exercising jurisdiction  because of SOFA, MOU ... as analysed above already, so I do not 
want to repeat here, what I want to analyse more here is that the ICC’s jurisdiction over 
peacekeepers’ superiors if it is the case.  
 
The article 28 of the Rome Statute specifies the criminal responsibility of commanders and 
superiors who have ”effective command and control” over their subodinates, however, 
what does it mean by ” effective command and control”, especially in the context of 
peacekeeping operations. I will examine this question in the following: 
 
In general, command is ”the authority of a commander to lawfully exercise over his/her 
subodinates by virtue of the rank or appointment held”76. Command provides the authority 
and responsibility for effectively planning and executing the employment of assigned 
resources to achieve the mission. In military context, there are may: (i) ”full command” 
that are the authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates, 
it covers every aspect of military operations and administration. This kind of command 
exist only in national context; (ii) operational command, that is the authority of a 
commander to assign missions or tasks, redeploy forces, and reassign forces. It does not 
include responsibility for administration or logistics; (iii) Tactical command, that is the 
authority of commander to assign tasks to forces under their command. It has narrower 
scope to operational command.77    
 
                                                 
76 Command and Control, in “Legal Framework of UN Forces and Issues of Command and Control of 
Canadian can Irish Forces” by Ray Murphy 
77 Command and Control in “Legal Framework of UN Forces and Issues of Command and Control of 
Canadian can Irish Forces” by Ray Murphy 
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In a national army, the chain of command is unified and concerted from the top down to the 
bottom (From the Head of State to the Defence Minister to the Army Commander in Chief 
to .... to lowest ranking soldiers). 
 
Differently from a national army, in UN PKOs there are three levels of command : the 
Security Council is in charge of overall political direction, the Secretary General is in 
charge of executive direction and control, and the command in the field is carried out by 
the head of mission (Special Representative of the Secretary-General or the Force 
Commander or Chief Military Observer).78 With regards to low-ranking members, as the 
troops come from many different countries and come in contingents, military member of 
contingents are under the UN’s operational control only,79  that is ”It evolves the full 
authority to issue operational directives within the limits of (1) a specific mandate of the 
Security Council; (2) an agreed period of time, with the stipulation that an earlier 
withdrawal requires adequate prior notification; and (3) a specific geographical range (the 
mission area as a whole)”.80  An additional limitation is that the Organization does not 
discipline or promote individual members of military contingents, functions which remain 
under the purview of their national authorities.81   
 
To assist the Security Council and the Secretary-General, there are severel bodies within 
the UN Secretariat, the funtions and working mechanisms of these bodies are also 
complicated. While the Department of Peace Keeping Operation (DPKO) is responsible for 
providing with policy guidance and strategic direction, the Department of Field Support 
(DFS) is responsible for providing logistical and administrative support. Under-Secretary-
General for Field Support reports to the Under-Secretary-General for Peackeeping 
Operation on all peacekeeping related matters, while the Standing Integrated Operations, 
located within DPKO, provides integrated policy advice and guidance for senior DPKO 
                                                 
78 UN Doc. A/49/681 par.4 
79 UN Doc. A/49/681, par.6 
80 UN Doc. A/49/681, par.6 
81 UN Doc. A/49/861 par.6 
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and DFS staff.82 In short, there is no clear-cut in PKOs’ chain of command and decisions 
making as  in a national military apparatus.  
 
In facts, different PKO has different chain of command, and Head of Mission/ Force 
Commanders not all the time have effective control over their subordinates, take the case of 
operation in Somali as example (UNOSOM II)83, in this operation, orders from the UN 
affecting United States forces were transmitted from the UN Force Commander to the 
United States troops through the UNOSOM II Deputy Commander, Major General 
Montgomery, a US army general and the Commander of US Forces in Somalia. The 
General Montgomery then reported directly to the Commander in Chief of United States 
Central Command. The Deputy Commander of UNOSOM II even could have tactical 
control of the force delegated to him if the situation within Somalia so required. This in fact 
likes a parrallel chain of command to the one of the UN.84 
 
The special characteristics of chain of command of the UN PKOs as analysed above, that 
are there is no full command or even command in conventional meaning but only 
”operational control”, the complicated and not efficient reporting and coordinating systems, 
the status of military members of national contingents lead to the fact that superiors in 
PKOs not always have ”effective authority and control” over their subordinates, the other 
possibility is that subordinates might or might not obey UN orders or, they might obey not 
only UN orders but also carry out orders from their own government, will create difficulty 
for the ICC to identify criminal responsibilities of superiors in cases of subordinates’ 
violation according to the article 28, par.1 of the Rome Statute.   
 
Both Brahimi Report and the Guidelines and Principles of the UN on PKOs call for a 
unified and concerted chain of command in UN operations, but this is not the case of all 
                                                 
82 Authority, Command and Control in Multi-dimentional UN PKO, UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles 
and Guidelines 
83 This case is also mentioned in A/49/681 under the Part: Forces not under direct United Nations Command. 
Para.21 
84 “The command and control of United Nations Forces in Somalia” in Article “ Legal framework of UN 
Forces and Issues of Command and Control of Canadian and Irish Forces by Ray Murphy 
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UN PKOs. This problem to some extent and in theory can be solved by stipulation in the 
Memorendum of Understanding signed between the UN and troops contributing countries, 
but surely it depends on the willingness of the parties, and in case the troops contributing 
countries want to influence an operation, it is difficult for the UN to have real ”effective 
command or control” on the forces in the operation.   
 
The second difficulty for the ICC is to identify the mental element of crime because of the 
chain of command of PKOs. The article 30 of the Rome Statute states that a person means 
to have intent where: ” ... is aware that is will occur in the ordinary course of events”85. It 
means if there is a commission of acts of crimes, and there is a person who was aware that 
acts would happen, that person may be prosecuted anyway. This provision when we read in 
line with the provision in article 28 of the Rome Statute that is the commanders and 
superiors is responsible for acts of their subodinates if they ”either knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known”86 surely will bring difficulties for the ICC 
in identifing whether the superior of peacekeepers ”knew” or ”should have known” or 
”aware” in order to keep them responsible criminally. This difficulty become even more 
complex as in reality the UN troops may still keep contacts with their own governments 
during term of operation,87 so sometimes the governments are aware of the situation but 
not the UN or they have the information in the field earlier than UN officials. Further more, 
the UN Force is allowed to acts only in accordance with mandates set by the Security 
Council Resolution, so it’s not always possible for superirors of UN Forces to take ”all 
necessary and reasonable measures” as provided in the article 28. 1 (b) and 28.2 (b) of the 
Rome Statute.   
                                                
 
 
85 Article 30, par. 2 (b) of the Rome Statute.  
86 Par. 2. (a) article 28 of the Rome Statute 
87 Jaume Saura, “Each national contingent, however, remains under the authority of a national commander, 
and most countries never actually relinquish control over their troops” in Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability 
of IHL to UN PKOs, Hastings Law Journal; Vol 58: 479  2006 - 2007 
 38
3.2.4 Limitation on the ICC’s jurisdiction over peacekeepers as a result of 
the fact that crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction are not numerous 
 
In previous sections I mentioned some impediments to jurisdiction of the ICC over 
peacekeepers and for those impediments I would like to use the term ”objective” 
impediments that is the impediments come from outside factors rather than from the ICC 
itself. In addition to those objective impediments, there are ”subjective” impediments that I 
want to note in this section that is the limitation on the ICC’s jurisdiction over 
peacekeepers arising from the limited number of crimes falling under the ICC as stated in 
the Rome Statute.  
 
As stipulated in the article 5 of the Rome Statute, those crimes are: crime of genocide, 
crimes against humanity; war crimes and the crime of aggression. In fact, not much of 
violations by peacekeepers fall in these crimes, the reasons are as follows:  
 
With regards to the crime of aggression, that is ” planning, preparation, initiation or waging 
a war of agression ...”88 with the acts of agression such as: invasion or attack by armed 
forces, bombardment of armed forces, attack by the armed forces, blockade of ports or 
coasts, illegal use of one state’s armed forces being situated in another state, sending armed 
bands, groups etc, which carry out acts of armed forces of serious gravity. 89 Put it in more 
practical, aggression is acts of violating territorial sovereignty and intergrity of a state 
without consent of that state. I may say that it’s hardly if not to say it’s impossible that 
peacekeepers would commit acts of aggression. Firstly, because PKOs by its nature are 
collective security actions of the UN, they are deployed to keep peace and security, their 
deployment or presence in a country have authorization from the UN (by resolution of the 
Security Council), their presence even have consent of the host states (as there is always a 
Status of Forces Agreement is agreed upon between the UN and the host state). Secondly, 
peacekeepers when participating in an UN PKOs, they work for the international 
                                                 
88 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
89 International Criminal Law, Cassese, page 114 
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community as a whole, with mission and mandate from the UN, and their violations 
individually (as this study focuses on) is hardly qualified as acts of armed forces that fall on 
the list mentioned above, therefore it can be said that it is not likely that peacekeepers will 
commit the crime of aggression.  
 
With regard to the crime of genocide, there are possibility for peacekeepers commit this 
crime is that they may knew or should have known about a plan to commit genocide and 
did not take neccesary steps to prevent the crime happening, as some critics say about the 
role of UN Force in Srebrenica in case of genocide of Muslim there, as according to article 
30 of the Rome Statute, a person has intent where, ” in relation to a consequence, .... is 
aware that it will occur ...”90, but as I have analysed previously the chain of command in 
the UN PKOs is different from that in a national army and an UN force is allowed to act 
within a given mandate only, in addition to that communication between field offices and 
UN headquarters is not always smooth. This will lead to a question that should UN forces 
act beyond their mandate in order to prevent the crime of genocide happening or should 
they respect the Rule of Engagement and mandates given to them? Who, at which level 
(UN headquarter, ex. the Security Council, the Secretary-General or Head of the Mission) 
will make that kind of decision in a very pressing moment? Given all these aspects, 
ethnically or morrally, it is easy for us to say that UN forces or peacekeepers commiting the 
crime of genocide,  but it is not easy for courts to sentence peacekeepers for the crime of 
genocide legally.  
 
With regard war crimes, that are ”grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949”91. According to the Secretary-General Bulletine on Observance by UN Forces on 
international humanitarian law, members of the military personnel of a United Nation force 
are subject to prosecution in their national courts, in case of violations of international 
humanitarian law.92 So for ordinary violations of IHL, the national courts of troops 
                                                 
90 Article 30, par.2 (b) of the Rome Statute 
91 Article 8, the Rome Statute 
92 Section 4 SG’s Bulletin on Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law. 
ST/SGB/1999/13 dated 6 August 1999 
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contributing countries will have jurisdiction over the peacekeepers. What about serious or 
grave violations, which will qualify as war crimes? Actually, paragraph 1 of the article 8 of 
the ICC Statute saying that the Court shall have jurisdiction on war crimes, particular when 
committed ”as a part of a plan or policy or as part of large-scale commission”.93  With that 
condition set by the Rome Statute, we can deduce that even in case of violations of IHL 
amounting to war crimes, it is likely that national courts will still have jurisdiction over the 
cases as there is no plan or policy of the United Nations to make such acts of crimes 
happen. 
 
With regard to crimes against humanity, paragraph 1 of the article 7 of the Rome Statute 
sets out one contextual element of the crimes is that the acts of violations committed as 
”part of a widespread or systematic attack” directed against any civilian population. 
Paragraph 2 of that article gives more explaination on that, it states that: ” attack directed 
against any civilian population” means ”a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of acts ...., pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to 
commit such attack;”. In case of UN PKOs it means the organization must have a policy to 
attack against any civilian population. If consider the organization’s policy is the policy at 
the highest level of the organization, in case of UN that is the General Assembly, I can say 
for sure that the Organization does not have a policy to attack against any civilian 
population. Therefore, in my personal point of view, even though there are widespread 
violations committed by peacekeepers (as the case of Somalia or sexual violations in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo), but those violations committed are not ”pursuant to or in 
furtherance of the Organization’s policy” because there is no such a policy for 
peacekeepers to further or act in pursuance to.  
 
Personnally,  I’m of the view that the ICC is not the most appropriate and effective for 
prosecuting peacekeepers. However, I also support the idea of those who initiate the 
complimentary role of the ICC, especially the positive complimentary role, that is the Court 
will step in if national courts do not discharge their job well (unwilling to prosecute 
                                                 
93 Par.1 article 8 of the Rome Statute 
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”genuinely” is the word of the Rome Statute) or in case national courts are unable to carry 
out their job, there is the ICC to share the burden. For the ICC to play that positive 
complimentary role, it must have jurisdiction over peacekeepers in principle. With the 
obstacles to the ICC’s jurisdiction as mentioned above, in most of the cases the jurisdiction 
of the ICC is excluded by provisions in SOFA, MOU, SG’s Bulletin, by immunities that 
peacekeepers are given, can the ICC play the positive complimentary role effectively? One 
may argue that the ICC can as if the home state or the host state which are state party to the 
ICC Statute waive their jurisdiction over peacekeepers and refer the case to the ICC. Yes, it 
can, but this puts the ICC into a passive position to play its role. Why dont’ we put things 
in an opposit order that is because peacekeepers are different from other kind of 
perpetrators, they have a special status, a status of subsidiary organ of the UN, they are UN 
personnel, they are international personnel, and immunities accorded to them is to facilitate 
their job, not to hinder the cause of justice, so as international personnel or personnel of the 
UN in other words, first and foremost they should be accountable before the UN and 
subject to the UN’s jurisdiction, that is if they committed a grave violation of substantive 
law (human rights law, humanitarian law) that amount to international crime, shocking the 
whole international community, they will be first and foremost subject to jurisdiction by 
the international court, and if the UN at its disposal decides to repatriate that peacekeepers 
to his home country for prosecution, it can do it, and the home state can carry the 
prosecution job consequently. I think this may make the status of ”international personnel” 
of peacekeepers more sense than currently is. Of course this is another story and beyound 
the scope of this thesis.  
4 Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 
In summary, the existing prosecution process of peacekeepers have many flaws. The ICC 
has difficulties in exercizing jurisdiction, the courts of home countries are favourable in 
term of exercising jurisdiction will face financial difficulties because of the geographical 
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distances  and difficulties in investigating because of differences in legal systems between 
countries, the courts of the host countries have the advantages in term of undertaking 
investigation face difficulties because of provisions on immunities and jurisdiction and 
procedures for initiating proceedings against peacekeepers in the SOFA which limit and 
exclude its jurisdiction possibility. All of these difficulties together with the not strong 
enough determinations of all parties involved (troops contributing countries do not want to 
try their soldiers because of a crimes committed in a land far away, the UN hesitates to 
oppose the troops contributing countries on the matter as that may lead to difficulty in 
mobilizing forces for future operations) make the prosecution have not been effective yet.  
 
The other flaw is that, as we can see from agreements between the UN and the host states 
(SOFA), between UN and home states (MOU), the current procedures to deal with the 
alleged peacekeepers is that, the host country/victims report the case to the UN (the UN 
Force in the field), base on that information the UN will make an inquiry of the case, if it 
found that there was convincing evidence of crime committed, the UN can agree for the 
host country to initiate proceeding against the peacekeeper,94 or it may undertake some 
kind of disciplinary measures with that peacekeeper internally,95 or it may repatriate that 
peacekeeper to home country for punishment.96 This is in fact time consuming procedure. 
It makes difficult for investigation agencies as a long time will have passed from the time 
the crime is committed until the time the prosecution can start.  
                                                
 
The other problem which is not particular for prosecution of peacekeepers is that, the 
coordination and cooperation between parties concerned. The coordination within the UN 
in dealing with allegations of peacekeepers’ violations, the UN Forces in the field are not 
always cooperative with the UN Inquiry Commission from the UN Head quarter. The 
coordination between the UN and the troops contributing countries in ensuring that the 
violated peacekeepers will be punished back home. The coordination and cooperation 
 
94 Procedures for initiating a proceeding against peacekeepers by the host state, par. 47 of model SOFA 
95 There is internal disciplinary mechanism within the UN. 
96 As provided in MOU between the UN and the contributing country and relevant provisions in UN 
documents concerned, mentioned previously.  
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between the host country and the home country in investigating and trial. Lack of this 
coordination and cooperation create loopholes for peacekeepers go unpunished for their 
violations.  
 
To clear these loopholes there should be measures undertaken. That may namely: 
 
At political level, in addition to SOFA signed between the UN and the host state, MOU 
signed between the UN and the home states, there should be an agreement on judiciary 
cooperation between the home state and the host state in legal proceedings relating to 
peacekeepers. This judiciary cooperation agreement on the one hand will help facilitate the 
investigation work, on the other hand it may provide possibility for the host state to 
prosecute violated peacekeepers on behalf of the troops contributing state (with consent 
from the contributing state of course) or possibility for the troops contributing state to 
undertake the trial on the territory of the host state. This will have much positive effects on 
the credibility of the justice system and of the UN peacekeeping operations as well, as the 
local community and the victims can easily see how the perpetrators have to pay for their 
violated acts.  
 
There should be clear and strong provision on obligation to discipline and prosecute 
violated peacekeeper in relevant documents. The obligation should be stated concretely 
with regard to the UN, the Troops Contributing Country.  
 
Strengthening the monitoring mechanism, the responsibility to monitor and early aware of 
violations should be clearly assigned to specific persons, for example heads of contingent 
are responsbible for monitoring members of contingent under his control. Together with 
strengthening monitoring mechanism there should be concrete disciplinary forms for those 
who hide or tolerate violations.   
 
Set up Claim Units in PKO for the victims to reports about misconducts of peacekeepers, 
these units are charged with investigating the allegations and complaints, cooperate with 
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investigation and prosecution of the host state and home states if required. They should be 
independent from the chain of command of PKO. The functioning of these units will 
require the awareness, knowlege and cooperation from local people. So Claim Units should 
also be responsible for disseminating information on norms and conducts of peacekeepers 
to local population as well as other relevant information. Each PKO has a Claim unit and 
this unit should belong to a permanent Claim Commission of the UN system as a whole. 
This will help the work of inquiry being done more professionally than currently carried 
out by Inquiry commissions which set up and work on ad hoc basis.  
 
And as preventing crimes happening is always better than processing committed crimes, so 
training and educating peacekeepers not to commit crimes should be prioritized. The troops 
contributing countries should be responsible for training in advance the troops that they 
contribute. The  UN again has responsibility for training the troops when they become 
personnel of UN and especially when deployed in the field. It must be sure that 100 % of 
peacekeepers understand norms and conducts they should follow, the relating laws and 
regulations when they participate in a peacekeeping operation. In addition, the material and 
spiritual life of peacekeepers should receive due attention as they are working in difficult 
environment  ( far away from family, lack of recreational facilities in the field of 
operation). 97 
 
Lastly is the parennial problem of coordination and strong commitment of all actors in 
international community in bringing perpetrators to justice, to ensure rights of the victims. 
When a violation happen, it should be dealt with as quick as possible, the victims should be 
able to receive legal aid as well as other necessary assistance available.  
Security Council 
Secretary-General 
Head of Mission 
Mission Headquarters 
and Leadership Team 
 
                                                 
97 For more discussion, see UN Doc. A/59/710 
 45
References 
 
United Nations Charter 
The UN Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The ICC Statute  
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
Marten Zwanenburg, “Accountability of Peace Support Operations”, Martinus Nijhoff  
Publishers, Leiden, 2005 
UN Peacekeeping: A Documentary Introduction 
The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, Second Edition, 2008, Oxford 
University Press, Section 258 
Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003)  
“Legal Framework of UN Forces and Issues of Command and Control of Canadian can 
Irish Forces” by Ray Murphy 
Jaume Saura, “ Lawful Peacekeeping: Applicability of IHL to UN PKOs”, Hastings Law 
Journal, Vol 58,  2006 - 2007 
“United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines” 
“The prosecution and Defense of peacekeepers under international criminal law”, Geert-Jan 
Alexander Knoops, Transnational Publisheers, 2004 
 
UN Doc. A/55/305 – S/2000/809 
Resolution 998 (ES – I) dated 4 November 1956 
UN Doc. S/RES/745/(1992) 
UN Doc. A/59/710 
UN Doc A/45/594 
UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 
UN Doc. A/46/185 (23 May 1991) 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/96 
UN Doc. A/RES/52/12 b 
UN Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002) 
UN Doc. S/RES/1487 (2003) 
UN Doc. S/RES/1497 (2003) 
UN Doc. A/49/681 
 
Fact and figures about PKOs at website: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm 
 
Website: http://www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/aboutpkwatch.html 
 
Accountability within Peace Operations, International Forum for the Challenges of Peace 
Operations, website: www.challengesproject.net 
 
 46
Wikipedia Dictionary 
 
UN publication in 2008 ”The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and 
Guidelines”, Available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf 
 
Ten Rules Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/Conduct/ten_in.pdf 
 
“Beasts in Blue Berets” available at 
http://ww.whatreallyhappened.com/RANCHO/POLITICS/UN/peace.html 
 
 47
Annex  
Annex 1: A standard form of Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) (UN DocA/45/594 
dated 9 October 1990) 
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Annex II: Model of Agreement Between the United Nations and Member 
States Contributing Personnel and Equipment to United Nations Peace-
keeping Operations. UN Doc. A/46/185 (23 May 1991) 
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